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Abstract: 
In most countries, the education system seeks to instill two kinds of solidarity: a thick sense of national solidarity with one’s 
co-citizens, and a thinner sense of global solidarity with all of humanity. Many commentators argue that we need to rebalance 
these two forms of solidarity, de-emphasizing national solidarity and re-centering global solidarities. More radical 
commentators argue that we should abandon ideas of national solidarity entirely as inherently exclusionary and outdated. I will 
suggest that we in fact need both kinds of solidarity, although our conception of education for national solidarity needs to reflect 
our multicultural realities. 
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Solidarities: National, Multicultural and 
Cosmopolitan1 
Public education has historically promoted two forms of 
solidarity: (1) a bounded national solidarity, often tied to 
ideas of being a “good citizen” of the nation-state, and to 
associated ideas of loyalty and patriotism; and (2) an 
unbounded global solidarity, often tied to ideas of universal 
human rights, and to associated ideas of respect for shared 
humanity and human dignity. Other levels of solidarity in-
between the nation and the globe have sometimes also played 
a role in education, most obviously in recent efforts to 
promote solidarity within the EU,2 but also in earlier efforts 
to promote pan-Africanism or pan-Arabism. However, in 
general, debates about solidarity have typically revolved 
around the dialectic between national and global solidarities. 
For many commentators in these debates, there has been 
a fundamental imbalance in the significance accorded to the 
two levels of solidarity. National education systems have 
prioritized national solidarity as a political imperative, while 
treating global solidarity as a largely symbolic afterthought. 
Moreover, national solidarity has often been defined in 
narrow and assimilationist ways, defining the nation in terms 
of the majority’s language, race, religion and culture, while 
ignoring or stigmatizing minorities. Traditional conceptions 
of national solidarity are therefore seen as both occluding our 
obligations to the world outside our national borders and 
creating injustice to minorities within those borders. 
For these and other reasons, it is now widely agreed that 
traditional conceptions of national solidarity, and the models 
of citizenship education based on them, are inadequate to the 
realities of diverse 21st century classrooms and societies, and 
to the challenges of an increasingly mobile and 
interdependent world. However, there remains a deep 
disagreement about whether our aim is to rehabilitate 
national solidarity, so that it can continue to play a legitimate 
role alongside global solidarity, or whether the very idea of 
national solidarity is irredeemably flawed and obsolete.  
In this short paper, I want to make a case for retaining a 
role for national solidarity, albeit in a significantly revised 
form, and more generally, for retaining the idea that public 
education should promote both national and global 
solidarities. I cannot respond to all of the worries people have 
about national solidarity, but I will focus in particular on the 
challenge raised by global mobility. Traditional ideas of 
national solidarity were defined for a more sedentary world 
and are often steeped in narratives about how national 
citizens are “rooted” in particular national homelands.3 Do 
these ideas make any sense in a world on the move? 
This is a complicated question, in part because different 
modes of migration have different relations to national 
citizenship. Some migrants become citizens: they are able to 
naturalize and thereby gain rights of membership in the 
political community where they reside. In traditional 
countries of immigration, there is a relatively clear path for 
some immigrants to become citizens. These immigrants are 
admitted as permanent residents, and having made their life 
in a new country, they have a right to naturalize after a period 
of residency (e.g., 5 years), and thereby be included in “the 
people” in whose name the state governs.4  
The challenge to ideas of national solidarity in this 
context seems clear: we need to revise inherited conceptions 
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of “the nation” or “the people” to recognize the full diversity 
of all those who are members of society. Conceptions of “the 
people” have historically been tied to exclusionary and 
homogenizing narratives of nationhood, privileging majority 
ways of belonging while denigrating or rendering invisible 
minority identities and contributions.  A central task of 
citizenship education is to replace older exclusionary ideas of 
nationhood with a more inclusive conception which 
challenges inherited hierarchies of belonging, and which 
insists that society belongs to all its members, minority as 
much as majority. All members have a right to shape 
society’s future, without having to deny or hide their 
identities. Minorities, on this view, including minorities 
formed through the permanent settlement of immigrants, are 
not “guests”, “visitors”, “aliens” or “foreigners”, but are 
“members” and “citizens”.  
This has been a long-standing goal of multicultural 
education, to create a more multicultural conception of 
nationhood and national belonging. Multicultural education 
has been subject to waves of enthusiasm and skepticism, and 
I’ll return to the skepticism below. But it’s worth 
emphasizing that multicultural education – at least on this 
traditional understanding - rests on the assumption that 
immigrants settle permanently, and thereby qualify as 
“members” of “the people”. Contemporary states are 
grounded in ideas of popular sovereignty: it is “the people” 
who are the bearers of sovereignty, which they exercise 
through the state, and permanently-settled immigrants should 
be seen as members of the people in this sense. Multicultural 
citizenship education tells us to acknowledge the diversity of 
the members of our society, but this is tied to the assumption 
that immigrants have indeed settled for long enough to pass 
the relevant threshold of membership, transitioning from 
being visitors to being members. 
This is not necessarily true of temporary migrants. Most 
people do not think that tourists, international students, 
business visitors, or seasonal workers necessarily have a 
legitimate claim to political membership. Tourists who visit 
for one month, or international students who come to study 
the local language for six months, do not typically have a 
right to naturalize, or to vote in elections. They are indeed 
more like “guests” or “visitors” than “members” or 
“citizens”.  
Moreover, temporary migrants often do not wish to be 
treated as members or citizens, insofar as “membership” 
often entails obligations as well as benefits. Members may be 
subject to both formal legal obligations (e.g., jury duty) as 
well as informal social expectations (e.g., to become 
competent and informed about national politics). As Ottonelli 
and Torresi note, these formal and informal obligations may 
not be desired or welcomed by temporary workers. Given 
their “temporary migration projects”, they may prefer to be 
seen as visitors, and may not wish to be recruited 
involuntarily into the obligations and expectations of national 
solidarity (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2012).  
Temporary migrants therefore do not “fit” within most 
accounts of national belonging, even within explicitly 
multicultural accounts of nationhood. This is clear in the 
multiculturalism policies adopted in Canada and Australia, 
which restrict their programming to citizens or permanent 
residents, and which exclude temporary workers (such as the 
seasonal agricultural workers who come to Canada from 
Mexico at harvest time). Since these groups are not citizens, 
and are not eligible to become citizens, they are not seen as 
members of the multicultural Canadian nation.5 
To say that temporary migrants are excluded from 
multicultural national citizenship is not to say that they lack 
claims of justice. They may be visitors not members, but they 
are human beings, and as such have claims based on their 
shared humanity. And this of course raises the second level 
of solidarity I noted earlier, based on universal 
humanitarianism rather than bounded national solidarity. 
Whether or not someone is a member of the nation, we must 
always respect their shared humanity, and avoid treating 
them in ways that are dehumanizing or degrading. We cannot 
enslave visitors, subject them to torture or to degrading work, 
or treat them in ways that violate their human dignity. This 
second level of cosmopolitan solidarity is often expressed 
through the idiom of universal human rights, owed to all 
individuals in virtue of their intrinsic moral status, and one of 
the central tasks of education is to inculcate respect for 
human rights and human dignity. Given the rapid rise in 
various forms of temporary, circular, forced and irregular 
migration, it is more important than ever that students learn 
to respect the basic human rights of all people, including the 
temporary visitors in their midst, the asylum-seekers at the 
border, and the displaced and oppressed half-way around the 
world. 
So we might think of civics education in an age of 
migration as having two strands. First, there is citizenship 
education in the narrow sense, which focuses on how 
members of the people exercise their popular sovereignty. 
This requires some account of how a society determines who 
qualifies for membership, including how long-settled 
immigrants become members, and I would argue that 
requires a distinctly multicultural conception of national 
belonging. Second, there is human rights education, which 
focuses on an ethics of respect for human dignity, and which 
is inherently cosmopolitan, applicable whether or not the 
person is a member of our society, no matter how temporary 
their stay, or indeed whether they are present in the country 
or not.  
This combination of (multicultural) national solidarity 
and (humanitarian) global solidarity can be found in accounts 
of civics education around the world. From Cambodia to 
Canada, many educators seek to both expand our conception 
of national membership to acknowledge all those who have 
settled permanently and made their life in the country (i.e., 
we need a multicultural ethic of political membership); and 
simultaneously to strengthen respect for the human rights of 
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all, even those who are just temporarily resident or whose 
rights are at risk in neighbouring or distant countries (i.e., we 
need a cosmopolitan ethic of human rights).6  
While both strands are present in many countries, 
enthusiasm for the multicultural citizenship strand has 
waned. There are several factors that explain this. One is 
skepticism about whether national narratives of membership 
can ever be truly transformed in a multicultural direction.  In 
several countries, earlier moments of openness to 
multiculturalism seem to have closed, and more 
homogenizing national narratives have been reasserted (e.g., 
in France, the UK, Germany). So an earlier enthusiasm about 
the possibility of generating a compelling multicultural 
conception of nationhood has faded.7 This pessimism seems 
particularly acute in the Old World countries of Europe, with 
their deeply embedded national identities, and some 
commentators have speculated that multiculturalism only 
works in New World countries founded as “nations of 
immigrants”. 
I do not share this pessimism. Embracing multicultural 
conceptions of nationhood may be difficult in the Old World, 
but it was difficult in the New World as well. Canada today 
may be seen as a beacon of multiculturalism, but until the 
1960s, it defined itself as a British settler society, and had 
racially discriminatory immigration policies and 
assimilationist education policies designed to maintain this 
self-identity. The shift towards a multicultural national 
identity was deeply contested and was by no means 
predestined to succeed (Adams, 2007). And I would suggest 
that, notwithstanding fashionable talk of the “death” and 
“retreat” of multiculturalism in Europe, there are comparable 
examples of a steady shift toward multicultural nationhood.8  
However, even if multicultural citizenship is politically 
feasible, it faces a second challenge. Global migration has 
changed in a way that makes it more difficult to distinguish 
“permanent” migrants owed multicultural citizenship from 
“temporary” migrants owed cosmopolitan human rights. The 
very distinction between permanent and temporary migration 
is being challenged by scholars who argue that we are living 
in a world of “super-diversity” with a multitude of legal 
statuses that are neither wholly temporary nor wholly 
permanent, but rather have varying degrees and levels of 
conditionality and precariousness (Vertovec, 2007). This is 
reflected in calls to replace the old term “age of migration” 
with the new term “age of mobility”. People no longer 
migrate permanently from country X to country Y; rather, 
they move repeatedly. They may become domiciled, but do 
not “settle”.  And one of the consequences of super-diversity, 
commentators argue, is that a multicultural conception of 
national citizenship is increasingly obsolete (Fleras, 2015). 
People can no longer be neatly divided into permanent 
“members” and temporary “visitors”: we are all just human 
beings who find ourselves in a particular place at a particular 
moment, all subject to risks of dislocation to global economic 
and environmental trends, all in various states of mobility. 
Both of these observations challenge the view that the 
best response to global migration is to combine multicultural 
national citizenship (for members) with universal human 
rights (for non-members). If multicultural citizenship 
requires being able to identify which newcomers have settled 
permanently and thereby become members, then the 
proliferation of conditional legal statuses, and the realities of 
circular and temporary mobility, mean that fewer newcomers 
will secure the protections of citizenship. And even those 
fortunate few who secure legal citizenship may find that they 
only achieve a second-class citizenship, constantly at risk of 
being judged alien or inadequate according to exclusionary 
narratives of nationhood. 
Given these trends, skepticism about multicultural 
citizenship is understandable. But what is the alternative? 
One option is to give more weight to cosmopolitan human 
rights, and to reduce the importance of membership rights. 
States may continue to restrict national citizenship to those 
newcomers who permanently settle, but we can try to 
minimize the political significance of this membership status. 
Even if migrant labourers are not eligible for national 
citizenship in, say, Austria, this should not affect their labour 
rights, their health care, or the education rights of their 
children. These should be seen as fundamental human rights, 
regardless of membership status. In this way, we can shrink 
the importance of national citizenship, and expand the 
importance of universal human rights. The goal is not to 
expand the Austrian state’s view of who is a member of the 
Austrian nation or people, as the multicultural citizenship 
approach would seek, but rather to insist that national 
membership should not determine people’s treatment across 
a range of important issues. The goal is not necessarily to 
enable them to become citizens, but rather to strengthen the 
rights they are owed as human beings – in effect, to reduce 
the price that non-members pay for their lack of political 
membership. 
A more radical suggestion would be to get rid of ideas of 
membership entirely, and to base civics education entirely on 
universal human rights. On this proposal, we would only 
recognize universal rights owed to human beings as such, 
without any attempt to distinguish members from non-
members. We would not ask Austrian children to think about 
their obligations to non-members; nor would we encourage 
them to have a more multicultural conception of membership 
in the Austrian nation: rather, we would encourage them not 
to think in terms of membership at all. 
This pure cosmopolitan is a powerful strand in 
contemporary political theory, precisely because of growing 
skepticism that multicultural citizenship can respond to the 
intransigencies of nationalism or the realities of global 
mobility. And so it is worth asking, can cosmopolitan human 
rights education take the place of multicultural citizenship 
education? Can we do without a politics of national solidarity 
grounded in membership and belonging, and rely instead on 
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a cosmopolitan solidarity grounded in respect for our shared 
humanity?  
There are both pragmatic and principled objections to 
pure cosmopolitanism. Pragmatically, if it is difficult to ask 
national majorities to embrace inclusive conceptions of 
national membership, it seems utopian to ask them to stop 
caring about membership at all. There are also pragmatic 
worries about political stability. A cosmopolitan 
commitment to universal human rights tells us nothing about 
where political boundaries should be drawn. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides no guidance on 
whether there should be 2 countries in the world, or 20, or 
2000, or where their internal and external boundaries should 
be drawn. A cosmopolitan might respond that any such 
boundaries should be seen as arbitrary, but it’s not clear that 
a democracy can function if its members view their 
boundaries this way. A stable democratic community 
requires that people have a sense of belonging together. For 
example, Norwegians feel that it is right and proper that they 
form a single political community which governs its 
members and its national territory, and that it would be wrong 
and unjust if Norwegians were subdivided or annexed. If the 
residents of Norway did not have this sense of belonging 
together – if they felt that they were just a random group of 
individuals thrown together in a randomly-drawn territory – 
there would likely be interminable disputes about jurisdiction 
and boundaries. 
And this in turn raises principled questions about whether 
“nations” or “peoples” have rights to self-determination and 
territorial sovereignty. Cosmopolitans tend to be dismissive 
of ideas of rights of self-government, but I would argue it is 
perfectly legitimate for the Norwegians – or the Navajo– to 
think of themselves as peoples with rights to self-
determination, including the right to govern themselves and 
their national homelands, which in turn includes the right to 
make choices about various streams of permanent and 
temporary migration.9 If so, then we are inevitably back to 
ideas of membership, and to distinguishing those settled 
immigrants who are owed membership rights from those 
visitors who are owed universal human rights.  
This suggests that human rights education and 
cosmopolitan solidarity cannot bear all the weight of civics 
education. Around the world, two distinct problems 
continually arise: some permanently-settled groups are 
wrongly denied their membership rights because they do not 
fit into the received national narrative; and other temporarily-
settled immigrant groups are denied their basic human rights. 
Cosmopolitan human rights education addresses the latter but 
not the former. Educating students to respect the basic rights 
of all people, regardless of their membership status, is a 
fundamental task. But so long as democratic politics is tied 
up with ideas of membership and belonging, then we also 
need to educate students to think about membership in an 
ethically responsible way, including how to critically 
evaluate the traditional criteria by which membership has 
been recognized.  
This was – and remains – a central task of multicultural 
citizenship education. The task is not to transcend or evade 
the distinction between members and non-members, but to 
think in a critical and ethically responsible way about the 
diversity of people that belong to society, and the diversity of 
ways in which they legitimately express that belonging.10 
Multicultural citizenship education has run into headwinds, 
but I would argue that it remains an essential part of civics 
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